EVERY so often, it takes one isolated instance of misdemeanour to spark off renewed demands for improved corporate governance. The need is felt more acutely in times of slowing demand; when the going is good, caution–and, indeed, good corporate governance – is thrown to the winds. Everybody swims along with the tide, and the whistle blowers are branded society’s curmudgeons.
The whole corporate governance issue  is popping its head up again after the pandemonium over the sordid Satyam-Maytas business. Much has been written, debated and  blogged over the proposed $1.6-billion merger between  the two companies, but you can bet your last last  dollar that the last word has not been spoken yet. The government in Delhi, the regulators in Mumbai, the  shareholders in New  York have all jumped  in and expect some more fireworks over the next few weeks. 
The initial public outburst was  caused by news that listed company Satyam Computer  Services was using its free cash – which belongs to all its shareholders — to  buy out two unlisted infrastructure and property development companies, both  owned by the managing shareholders of Satyam. These  companies were ostensibly incurring losses and the buyout would have given them  a fresh lease of life. The deal had to be subsequently jettisoned as shareholder  fury shaved off over 30% of the share price in India and over 50% in the  ADR values in New York. Chastened  by the loss to the shareholders, the company then announced a buyback. Even this  is being seen as weird – using company cash once again to prop up share prices  when other options could have been examined. 
But, all this has refocused  attention on what constitutes proper corporate governance. One of the issues  raised is the role of independent directors and whether they can be held  accountable in decisions like these. Market regulator Securities and Exchanges  Board of India has been pressing companies to increase the number of independent  directors on their boards who will, presumably, represent the interests of the  minority shareholders. In the Satyam-Maytas muddle,  fingers have also been pointed at some of the independent directors, eminent  professionals in their own right, who unanimously approved the deal. 
So, does the mere fact of having a  certain percentage of the board as independent directors really help? In  USA, it was found that  many CEOs were getting their pals and cronies appointed as “independent”  directors and using them to get their pay packets and bonuses inflated. Who  monitors whether the word “independent” truly stands for what it is supposed to  denote? It is difficult to really prove that a person is truly independent,  unless his actions prove otherwise.
Sebi has been  trying hard to get public sector units, which are listed on the stock exchanges,  to appoint at least 50% of the board as independent directors. This has led to  enormous complications, including the debate whether in the case of a breach,  Sebi had the powers to penalise a PSU company, which can be considered as an arm of  the government. The situation could also extend to the bizarre. Take the case of  steel maker SAIL, which now has about 22 members on its board. Or, the case of  ONGC which has 17 members, comprising six executive directors (besides the CMD),  two government nominees and eight independent directors 
There is a similar farce playing out  in the public sector banks. Vadodara-based Senior  Citizens Service Trust has filed a public interest litigation (PIL) in the  Gujarat high court over the way 37 “independent” directors have been appointed  to the boards of various PSU banks, of which 33 owe their allegiance to the  Congress party. The independent directors are supposed to act as custodians of  the public money deposited with the banks and ensure that it is not all  frittered away through dubious loans.
Another area that’s crying out for  some vigilance by its directors is the mutual fund industry. The recent crisis  in the mutual fund industry – especially, as a result of the spree in launching  fixed maturity plans — should force Sebi to begin  reviewing the role of trustees in the three-layered mutual fund industry. Many  experts believe that trustees in an asset management company are somewhat like  independent directors in companies and should truly live up to their role of  safeguarding investor interest.
The point is this: none of the trustees was asking questions when the funds were busy launching one FMP after another. In many other companies, directors looked the other way while managements were busy massaging valuations with fictitious data. Today, they are trying to court indignant shareholders and convince cash-flush banks that they run bankable businesses. But no one’s biting yet.